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JOHN FINNIS 
ON REASON AND AUTHORITY  IN  LAW'S EMPIRE 
Law's Empire will shape jurisprudence by its admirably resourceful 
attention to understanding a community's law "internally". It pro- 
motes reflective understanding of the practical argumentation constitu- 
tive of the attitude(s) in which that law subsists. But the book neglects 
some of practical understanding's resources of political and moral 
theory, and overestimates practical reasoning's power to identify 
options as the best and the right) 
The book "takes up the internal, participants' point of view; it tries to 
grasp the argumentative character of our legal practice by joining that 
practice and struggling with the issues of soundness and truth partici- 
pants face" (14). 
Of  course, this '[joining" is, at least for the most part, an "only 
'virtual'" (422) participation; jurisprudence, as such, is only a 
propaedeutic to, or reflection upon, choosing; it is not itself a choice 
such as the participants themselves must make, to authorise or with- 
hold, or to risk or accept, coercion - and take the consequences. But 
1 All parenthetical and/or otherwise unattributed numbers are references to 
pages of Law's Empire. I shall pass over many good things in the book: its 
neo-classical identification (413) of the ontological basis of law in an attitude 
(voluntas, habitus) rather than in propositions, processes or persons as such; its 
identification, alongside its healthy individualism in ontology and epistemol- 
ogy, of the practical and moral reality of corporate responsibility ("personifi- 
cation") (167, 172, 296); its critique of two-level utilitarianism (290) and its 
comments on "academic" and "practical" elaboration of moral/political 
theory (285-87); its elaboration of community in terms of fraternity; its link 
between the theory of law, the theory of evil law, and the force of good 
law (110-11). 
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Dworkin rightly insists that jurisprudential work, insofar as it bears on 
the situation of some contemporary community, is genuinely con- 
tinuous, indeed homogeneous, with the practical reasoning which 
characteristically precedes actual legal choices (legislative, judicial, or 
private) in that community: "no firm line divides jurisprudence from 
adjudication or any other aspect of legal practice .... Juris- 
prudence is ... silent prologue to any decision at law" (90; see also 380). 
The theory rather confusingly labelled "law as integrity", but proposed 
as an alternative to the theories labelled conventionalism and prag- 
matism, "offers itself as continuous with - the initial part o f -  the 
more detailed interpretations it recommends" (226). And since the 
opportunity (or lack of opportunity) to make a choice - to literally 
join a practice and take the consequences - does not affect the 
argumentative content of practical reasoning, the jurisprudential 
method envisaged is equally available, in principle, to guide the study 
of communities and laws foreign to us, or past. 
Dworkin thus identifies argumentation (the argumentativeness of 
legal practice: 14) as centrally constitutive of the social phenomenon 
of law. Taking my cue from that, I have spoken here of  practical 
reasoning. 2 But that is not a term which Dworkin promotes. Instead, 
he prefers to speak of interpretation. Now "interpretation" is usually 
understood as, in a sense, passive or at least derivative, whereas practi- 
cal reasoning, reasoning towards choice and action, is understood as 
active and creative. And indeed, Dworkin sometimes finds in the pas- 
sivity or derivativeness implicit in the terminology of his master-con- 
cepts (amongst which interpretation has perhaps pride of place) a tacit 
and, I think, illicit support for his court-focussed concept of law. Con- 
sider, for example, his brief obiter dictum about legislation: it is "the 
practice of recognizing as law the explicit decisions of special 
bodies widely assumed to have that power [scil. of legislating]" (99, 
emphasis added). Shuffled out of view is the law-creating role and 
2 Of course, Dworkin often speaks, as we have seen, of law as a practice. But 
it is clear that he uses the term "practice" to include any way of thinking or 
arguing, any "methods [a social scientist's] ubjects use in forming their own 
opinions..." (64). 
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practice o f  legislatures; their responsibilities to engage in practical 
reasoning with an eye to the common good and the Rule o f  Law as 
Fuller outlined it thus never come into focus. 
But I am running ahead, and pointing to a weakness when, for the 
present, I want to dwell upon the illuminating strength of  certain o f  
the book's guiding conceptions. Notable amongst hese is certainly its 
author's willingness to endow his term or concept, interpretation, with 
much o f  the richness o f  practical reasoning's creative engagement 
with goods (including of  course their privation: harms) and ends or 
purposes. Of  the three terms I have just italicised, Dworkin really 
promotes only the term "purpose"; but above all he emphasises, mas- 
sively, their functional equivalent: the role of point in interpretation. 
The interpretative 3 attitude towards a practice assumes, he says, that 
the practice "has value, that it serves some interest or purpose or 
enforces ome principle - in short that it has some point" (47). Indeed, 
in the case of  some practices (such as the law) but not others (such as 
tennis), the interpretative attitude makes another assumption: that the 
requirements o f  the practice are "sensitive to its point", i.e., are to be 
"understood or applied or extended or modified ... by that point" (47). 
But at this juncture (which, as he says, is foundational for the whole 
book: 50), Dworkin shifts gear. The point or, synonymously here, the 
meaning o f  the social practice in question (courtesy, or law) is he says, 
to be "imposed" (47). 
Interpretation of... social practices ... is indeed essentially concerned with 
purpose not cause. But the purposes in play are not (fundamentally) those of 
some author but of the interpreter. Roughly, constructive interpretation is a 
matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it 
the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to 
belong (52). 
This last assertion leaves much unclear. Is the interpreter supposed to 
3 Using a "relaxed" and therefore (358) "liberal" conception of the require- 
ments of fit, I shall take as normative the usage established by the repeated 
use of "interpretative" on p. 107, and, seeking to put the book in "the best 
light" by a constructive interpretation, shall treat the appearance elsewhere 
of"interpretive" as a mere lapsus calami, a "mistake". 
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have some other purpose than the formal purpose of  making the 
object as good an instance of a genre as it can be.~ If genres provide 
the basis or framework of this formal purpose of interpretation, 
whose and what purposes inform and make the genre what it is.~ 
Dworkin does not stay to consider these issues. Indeed, what carries 
him towards his rather puzzling affirmation of the constructiveness of  
interpretation seems partly to be an equivocation on the word "cre- 
ative". Interpretation of art and social practice is to be called "creative" 
because it aims "to interpret something created by people as an entity 
distinct from them, rather than what people say, as in conversational 
interpretation, or events not created by people, as in scientific inter- 
pretation" (50). The syntax of  our language makes this use of  
"creative" hazardously equivocal between the thus announced mean- 
ing ("pertaining to the created") and the meaning ("creative of...") 
which is suggested by the metaphors of "imposing" and "construct- 
ing" meaning and purpose. 4 
The difficulties here are by no means all of  Dworkin's own 
making. We can, as I have suggested elsewhere, usefully bear in mind 
four orders of  intelligibility: the order (of nature) which is in no way 
established by human understanding; the order (studied by logic, 
methodology and epistemology) which one can bring into one's own 
understanding; the order which one can bring into objects (boats, 
phonemes, poems, constitutions) by making them according to an 
intelligible plan or purpose; and the order which one can bring into 
one's dispositions, choices and actions. By calling the interpretation 
which bears on law "creative", Dworkin seems to place it in the third 
order (of making, poeisis, factio) rather than the fourth (doing, praxis, 
actio). Aristotle, Aquinas and the classic Western tradition down to 
Bentham's uncomprehending attack upon it chose to envisage law 
4 Dworkin is clear that the official meaning of "creative" in his use of 
"creative interpretation" is simply %f a created object", and that, accordingly, 
"interpretation is by nature the report of a purpose; it proposes a way of" 
seeing what is interpreted ... as if" this were the product of a decision to 
pursue one set of themes or visions or purposes, one 'point', rather than an- 
other" (58-59). 
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(like the other main aspects of political reality) in the fourth order: 
law has its principal intelligibility as a guide to choice, proposed to a 
community of choosers by the choice of that community's law- 
makers. 5 Still, one of law's usually characteristic features is that it has 
part of its reality as symbols or formulations, which are created 
objects in the third order, brought into being by legislation (including 
judicial fiat) and thereafter imbued with a reality independent of the 
intentions and choices of their maker(s) - a reality which thus creates a
problem for interpretation distinct from the problem of interpreting 
those intentions and choices as acts. Moreover, we cannot say that when 
Dworkin calls legal interpretation "creative" he thereby locates it in 
the third order as opposed to the fourth, for he does 
not seem to have any such distinction in mind. But we can say that it 
would have been helpful if he had. For there is something distracting 
about his appeal to the interpretation of artistic creations as the para- 
digm of the activity (let us allow, for the present, that it is interpreta- 
tive) involved in the practice of law and legal argumentation, a prac- 
tice whicfl at bottom seeks to bring order into human choices and 
actions, present and future. 
Of  course, law in its central instantiations seeks to regulate present 
decisions and future conduct (acta, agibilia, agenda) primarily by 
attending to entities (rules, orders, precedents...) already existing 
because somehow brought into being in the past OCacta). Dworkin 
acknowledges this explicitly by embracing "the assumption that the 
most general point of law, if it has one at all, is to establish ajustifying 
connection between past political decisions and present coercion" 
(98). 6 But the acknowledgement leaves something to be desired, 
because this statement of "the most general point of law" revives or 
continues the puzzle about whose purposes or point are the primary or 
fundamental subject-matter of jurisprudential reflection upon law. 
Here, particularly, who is supposed to be doing the "establish- 
5 See, e.g., Aquinas, in Eth. 1, 1; Summa Theol. I-II, q. 90 aa. 1-4. On the four 
orders, see Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 136-39, 157. 
6 "The heart of any positive conception of law.., is its answer to the ques- 
tion why past politics is decisive of present rights" (117). 
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ing".~ The judge or jurist, now deliberating about the coercion which 
might now be ordered and, if so, justified by relation to the past deci- 
sions.~ Or the past decision-makers, who made their decision(s) with a 
view to establishing a justification - subsisting until terminated by 
preordained expiry or a new decision - fo r  future (including now 
present) coercion (and, as Hart would wish to remind us, other 
present and future social law-regarding conduct).~ 
If, as the paradigm of interpretation suggests, the establishing of the 
justifying connection with the past is the work (and purpose) of the 
judge or jurist, still it is clone as a moment in a process of justifying 
present choice and future conduct. It is done, in other words, in the 
course of  a process of practical reasoning - indeed, reasoning towards 
choice and action, praxis - in which the justifying relevance of the past 
decisions (enactments, precedents, customs, etc.) must compete with 
countervailing considerations of  expedience and principle. In that 
respect, his judicial or juridical process of reasoning or argumentation 
resembles - and has pro tanto the same point as - the reasoning which 
must precede any justified act of legislative decision-making. 
And if we take the other alternative, and suppose that the justifying 
connection is established primarily in the legislative decision and act, 
the point of legislating is, even more. obviously, in need of further 
identification. Classically, that point was identified as promoting the 
common good of the community for which the legislature is respons- 
ible. But that must be elaborated so a~s to articulate a more specific 
point, going to the legal form in which authority is thus exercised. 
This more specific point is summarised by the phrase "The Rule of 
Law", a mult i form point analysed by Fuller, Raz; and others in terms 
of the desiderata of formally or structurally good law-making. But this 
is scarcely attended to by Dworkin. 7
In short, interpretation according to Dworkin is to be understood 
on the model of  purpose, practical reasoning, and intention. This 
understanding lends power and illumination to his account of the 
interpretative attitude and its role in and in relation to law. But there 
7 "General theories of law, for us, are general interpretations of our own 
judicial practice" (410). Why be so narrow.~ 
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is an irreducible passivity or derivativeness about the concept of  inter- 
pretation, even after it has been transmuted by Dworkin from "of 
created reality" to "a creating and imposing of the interpreter's 
purpose" (and after "construction" has likewise slid from "construing" 
to  "creation"). 8 Interpretation resists being taken for  the whole of 
practical reasoning; or, perhaps more clearly, practical reasoning - e.g., 
political praxis - resists being rendered as "interpretation of a practice". 
Adjudication and juristic interpretation resist being taken for the con- 
stitutive and legislative moments in the life of  the law; those 
moments resist being understood, through and through, as 
interpretative. These resistances how up as missing or under- 
developed elements in the book's depiction of  law's empire - an 
empire which is thus treated as if it were acquired in the way  the 
British (some say) once acquired theirs: in a fit of absence of mind.  
In short: even if Dworkin succeeded in showing that his account of  
interpretation and the interpretative attitude in legal practice is the 
best account, he would not thereby have shown (nor does he other- 
wise show)that law and legal practice and its point are adequately 
described and explained by that account. 
II. 
There is more to be said about the book's epistemology before I turn 
to a more orderly treatment of  its political and jurisprudential theory. 
The "internality" of  fruitful jurisprudence has a dimension or implica- 
tion which goes beyond simply the resolve to understand legal 
phenomena as they are understood by those whose understanding and 
intending of them make them what they are. This further dimension 
or implication is in play in the book's discussion of "internal" and 
"external" scepticism (76-86). This discussion restates points made, 
8 Of course, the transmutation r slide does not go the whole way, but 
remains in the tension established by the requirements of "fit" and "sound- 
ness", the former tending to hold the interpreter to the pre-interpretative 
reality established by other people's purposes, practical reasoning and inten- 
tion(s). 
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perhaps more crisply and tellingly, in several recent articles by 
Dworkin. The correctness or otherwise of a legal answer to a legal 
question, or of a moral answer to a moral question, can be deter- 
mined only by one who enters into the legal, or moral, arguments 
and uses legal, or moral, criteria to judge one answer better than 
another. From within the practices of legal and moral argument, he 
disagreements noted by the external sceptic: are simply irrelevant 
- no argument at all. Arguments against he objectivity or truth of a 
particular legal or moral claim are worthless unless they are legal or, 
moral arguments. The external sceptic's denials that such claims can 
or do correspond to "transcendental reality" or "the fabric of the 
" " "9  universe trade on unexplained, indeed "incomprehensible meta- 
phors, and are empty and futile. 
Law's Empire concludes that "the only skepticism worth anything is 
skepticism of the internal kind" (86; see also 82). Internal scepticism 
accepts that some social practices (or other objects of interpretation) 
are better than others but denies that a particular object of interpreta- 
tion has any of the worth attributed to it by its participants and those 
who share their interpretative attitude. But this conclusion is stated 
without the ~clat of chapter 7 of A Matter of Principle. Indeed, Law's 
Empire's official position (80, 266) is that neither the general signifi- 
cance nor the rightness of external scepticism need be consider'ed in 
the book or, it seems, in any other jurisprudential (or political or 
moral) reflections. 
The truth that even widespread isagreement is no argument 
against a moral or legal assertion has an equally important counterpart: 
the fact of one's agreement with an assertion is no ground for 
agreeing. In the logic of argumentation, only the content of my 
knowledge or beliefs is relevant, not the fact that I possess them. 
Albeit in a rather specialised context (331-32), Dworkin very clearly 
adverts to this "transparency" of "I believe that p" for "It is true that 
9 A Matter of Principle, 172. See, for the arguments paraphrased in this para- 
graph, ibid., pp. 137-42, 171-77; Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Con- 
temporary Jurisprudence (1984), 277-80; Taking Rights Seriously (1978), pp. 
123-24. 
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p" and "p". He also states the implication of this transparency, viz., that 
in making any affirmation, reaching any conclusion, answering any 
question, one is "relying at the deepest level on what [one 
oneself] believes" (314). Dworkin's writings taken together make it 
clear that he rejects any subjectivist reading of this; in relying (say, for 
the premisses of an argument) on what one believes, one relies on it 
under the description what is [or: seems to be] the case, not under the 
description what I believe about what is the case. 
But I doubt whether Dworkin has focussed sufficiently on the 
implications of these positions. In my Maccabaean Lecture, 1° I noted 
that his arguments against enforcement of "majority preferences" fail 
to observe the transparency of many beliefs held and acted upon, by 
majorities, but not because they are so held. Law's Empire does not take 
up those arguments, o I need not restate that point. But it is worth 
noting here how often the book speaks in a way which, by syntacti- 
cally overlooking transparency, gives needless (and, I believe, unin- 
tended) comfort to a subjectivist reading of the book and a sub- 
jectivist understanding of ethical, political and legal theory. Consider 
the italicised redundancies in the following key statements: 
(i) "the exercise in hand is...: discovering which view of the 
sovereign matters we discuss sorts best with the convictions we 
each, together or severally, have and retain about the best account of 
our common practices" (86). 
(ii) '[Justice is a matter of the correct or best theory of moral and 
political rights, and anyone's conception o f  justice is his 
theory, imposed by his own personal convictions, of what these 
rights actually are" (97). 
(iii) "Hercules is not trying to reach what he believes is the best 
substantive r sult, but to find the best justification he can of a 
past legislative vent" (338). 
10 'A Bill of Rights for Britain? The Moral of Contemporary Jurisprudence', 
Proc. Brit. Acad. 71 (1985) at 309-11. 
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Or again: Perhaps Dworkin needed to say that the good judge decides 
a hard case "by employing his own moral convictions" (120), for he 
needed to make clear that the criteria of  soundness ultimately used by 
the judge are of  soundness as assessed by him, and not, in the last 
analysis, as assessed by (other members of) society. But he would have 
done well to add,' immediately, that the judge does not employ his 
moral convictions as his but as sound criteria, principles, rules or other 
factors relevant as premisses in an argument. 11
Finally, Dworkin seems to give relativists - legion amongst law 
students - needless (and again, I think, unintended) comfort by 
extending his denials much wider than was called for by the meta- 
phorical metaphysics of the external Sceptic. For Dworkin says that 
"the practices of interpretation and morality give these claims [about 
Hamlet and about the wrongness of  slavery] all the meaning they need 
or could have" (83, emphases added); and "the 'objective' beliefs most 
of  us have [about such matters] are moral, not metaphysical, beliefs" 
(82). True, those practices and beliefs do not include the external 
sceptics' bugaboos, "transcendental reality", "the fabric of  the 
universe", the "out there", etc. But they do, commonly, include or 
presuppose conceptions f what counts as human flourishing, and 
these conceptions not only presuppose some beliefs about the nature 
of things (e.g., freedom of choice, continuity of personal identity), 12 
but also contribute to (the rational justification of) other beliefs about 
the nature of  that (human) type of being whose flourishing could 
involve the opportunities and responsibilities which moral judgments 
assert it does. The truth that practical knowledge cannot be deduced 
from theoretical does not entail that there is no ontology of morals, 
or that ethics has nothing to learn from and nothing to Contribute to 
the metaphysical understanding of our nature and our world. 
1, Similarly, it is a pity Dworkin uses "conviction", rather than "considera- 
tion", "factor", "argument", or "principle", is passages such as: "The constraint 
fit imposes on substance ...is therefore the constraint of'one type of political 
conviction on another in the overall judgment [bye] which interpretation 
makes a political record the best it can be overall" (257, emphasis added). 
12 As Dworkin himself says, one's view about he point of law must rest on 
"large questions of'personality, life, and community" (101). 
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Epistemological or methodological issues closer to the central con- 
cerns of  jurisprudence are raised by Dworkin's account of the "seman- 
tic sting" and his rendering of legal positivism, legal Realism, and 
natural aw theory into "semantic theories of  law". Here the book 
seems to me confused and seriously misleading. 
The "semantic sting" is Dworkin's name for "the argument that 
unless lawyers and judges share factual criteria about the grounds of  
law there can be no significant thought or debate about what the law 
is" (44). "Semantic theories uppose that lawyers and judges use mainly 
the same criteria ... in deciding when propositions of  law are true or 
false..." (33). 
One notices at once the lack of  quantification of  "share factual 
criteria": share some, share many, share all? The second passage says: 
"mainly". But if this belief is fallacious - a poisonous ting to be drawn 
- it seems indistinguishable from Dworkin's ow'n belief that "the law- 
yers of  any culture where the interpretive attitude succeeds must 
largely agree at any one time" - agree, that is, "about what practices 
are legal practices", and about "legal paradigms, proposition[s] of law 
like the traffic code that we take to be true if any are" (91). When 
stating his view that such "pre-interpretive, agreement is a necessary 
precondition of  any flourishing interpretative, critical or juristic enter- 
prise, Dworkin claims that his view differs from the semantic sting in 
not supposing "that we identify these institutions [and paradigms] 
through some shared and intellectually satisfying definition of 
what a legal system necessarily is and what institutions necessarily 
make it up" (91). 
But the latter supposition seems quite distinct from the supposi- 
tions earlier said to constitute the semantic sting and the semanticism 
of semantic theories of  law - suppositions which, as we saw, made no 
assertions about "what a legal system necessarily is", but were iden- 
tified by Dworkin as claiming that the criteria of  "the law" which are 
used by judges and lawyers - presumably, of  a given, particular legal 
system - are "mainly shared". At this point I am not considering 
whether anyone has ever held any of  the semantic theories, or been 
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the victim of the semantic sting. I am concerned only with Dworkin's 
failure, both when defining vicious semanticism, and when speaking 
in his own voice, to distinguish between "the law" (of a 
particular community, the topic of  thought by that community's law- 
yers and judges) and "law" (a topic of  thought of  anthropologists, 
sociologists, other historians, moralists and jurisprudents such as Hart, 
Kelsen and Dworkin). Dworkin treats "the law" and "law" as 
synonymous, ~3and I fail to see how he can be so indifferent to the 
manifest difference between the two terms, corresponding to the dif- 
ference between the two sorts of  intellectual enterprise which I have 
just indicated. 
Positivist and natural aw theories in jurisprudence are not, and do 
not even look like, theories about the law of any particular communi- 
ty (in the sense of  offering to identify propositions of law which are 
true for that legal system), or about the criteria for identifying the law 
which are used by the lawyers and judges of any particular communi- 
ty. They look like theories about what law - a(ny) legal system -
"necessarily is" (at least in its paradigmatic nstantiations, its central 
cases). 
Moreover, such theories are not, and do not even look, "semantic", 
whether in the sense stipulated by Dworkin or in any other. Austin's 
"main idea", Dworkin says, was "that law is a matter of  historical deci- 
sions by people in positions of political power" (36). Hart's, he says, is 
"that the truth of  propositions of law is in some important way 
dependent upon conventional patterns of  recognizing law" (35). 
Neither "main idea" is semantic. 14
13 E.g., in describing semanticism, he moves - without comment, and in 
consecutive sentences - from (the assumption that) "we all use the same 
criteria in framing ... statements about what the law is" to (the assumption 
that) "we do share some set of standards about how 'law' is used" (32). 
14 The account of Hart is quite inaccurate, too. Dworkin asserts that, 
according to Hart, the rule of recognition, in whose acceptance li "the true 
grounds of law", "assigns to particular people or groups the authority to 
make law" (34). Consequently, anyone who obeyed Hitler's commands 
simply out of fear, and who thus did not accept a rule of recognition 
entitling Hitler to make law, would be committed, according to Dworkin's 
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Similarly, Dworkin's semantic rendering o f  natural law theory 
produces a thesis which natural law theorists have not treated as 
integral to their theories: "that lawyers fol low criteria that are not 
entirely factual, but at least to some extent moral, for deciding which 
propositions o f  law are true" (35). 
The truth is that neither positivism nor natural law theory is any 
more concerned about "how all lawyers use the word 'law'" (36) than 
Dworkin is) 5 The book's concern about the semantic sting and 
semantic theories o f  law seems to me a muddle and a distraction, save 
in one respect: the discussion o f  the pseudo-question whether 
immoral legal systems really count as law. It is the case that some legal 
philosophers, e.g., Hart, have thought that jurisprudence must make, 
"once and for all", a choice between a "wide" sense of" law" (such that 
the Nazis had law) and a "narrow" (such that they did not). Dworkin's 
discussion brings out well the context- and audience-relativity o f  
statements uch as "the Nazis had law" (103-04). 16 Contemporary 
, Hart, to say that "no propositions of law were true" in Nazi Germany (35). 
~This overlooks that Hartian rules of recognition are usually multiple, and 
contain rules which are in no way derived from (even when 
they are subject o) the supreme rule of change which identifies the people 
or group with supreme authority to make laws. 
15 As Dworkin quietly concedes in the notes tO another chapter, Hart's 
theory was not controlled by semantic considerations, but by judgments 
about "what would cure defects in the organization of political coercion that 
would be inevitable without [special egal] conventions [broadly accepted 
throughout the community]" (429), and by a view of which concept of law 
would "facilitate moral reflection" (430). Dworkin's discussion of Raz's 
positivism is inaccurate. He claims that it "explicitly denies any reliance on 
political convictions of any sort", and that it "fall[s] back on linguistic rules, 
to say that this is just what 'law' or 'authoritative' means under any criteria 
for its application educated lawyers and laymen all accept" (429-30).i In the 
article cited, viz, 'Authority, Law and Morality', The Monist 68 (1985): 
295-324, Raz in fact denies that he assumes any such conscious 
unanimity (p. 304) or conceptual c arity (p. 321), and founds his argument on 
claims about what practices are "servic[e]able" and beneficial (p. 304) and 
(evaluatively) "important" (p. 320). 
16 See also Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Ra'ghts, pp. 234-37, 365-66; 
contrast Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 203, 206-07; Essays on Bentham, p. 146. 
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jurisprudence, in some of  its arguments and positions; has indeed suf- 
fered somewhat from what I have  called "conceptual dogmatism", 
and Dworkin's protest against that is well taken, iv But he errs in 
claiming that the framework self-interpretation o f  recent juris- 
prudence is, has been, or can be usefully represented as concerned 
with or founded upon linguistic agreement, or being in any other 
way "semantic". 18 
IV. 
It is time to attend,to Dworkin's theory o f  law. But there is a bridge 
between his theory o£interpretation and one of  the main features o f  
his theory of  law "as integrity". The bridge: those pervasive Dwor-  
kinian categories, "the best" and "the right". 
The task o f  interpretation, remember,  is to make its object the best 
it can be (within its genre), to show it "in the best light possible" 
(243). The goal o f  law as integrity, i.e., o f  the interpretative attitude 
constitutive o f  the practice we call law, is to find in every situation of  
civil dispute the right answer which the given civil society's law makes 
available "in most hard cases" (viii), and which is identified by the best 
interpretation or theory of  that legal system. So: "Judges who accept 
the interpretive ideal o f  integrity decide hard cases by trying to  find, 
17 There has been a good deal of loose thinking, or talk, about "conceptual 
analysis", explaining "the concept of law", and the like. See, e.g., Natural Law 
and Natural Rights, pp. 278-79. But the malady is not well diagnosed in terms 
of "semantic theories", afortiori when "semantic" is itself used imprecisely (in 
the ways mentioned above, and so as to extend even to proposals about how 
words should be used: e.g., Law's Empire, 135). 
18 So Dworkin in the end misstates his legitimate point. He says that it is a 
mistake to ask whether wicked legal systems are law, because the question 
assumes that its answer turns on whether the linguistic rules we share for 
applying "law" include or exclude such systems - whereas in fact "we do not 
share any rules of the kind it assumes" (108): It would have been more 
accurate to say that while we do share linguistic rules which bear on the 
question, we can and do use or adapt or discard those rules, intelligibly, 
when certain contexts make our understanding and our communicative 
intentions ufficiently clear. 
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in some coherent set of  principles about people's rights and duties, the 
best constructive interpretation of  the political structure and legal 
doctrine of  their community!' (255; also 262). Law, or "law's attitude", 
"aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show 
the best route to a better future, keeping the right faith with the past" 
(413). "We accept integrity as a distinct political ideal, and 
we accept the adjudicative principle of  integrity as sovereign over 
law, because we want to treat ourselves as an association of  principle, 
as a community governed by a single and coherent vision of  justice 
and fairness and procedural due process in the right relation" (404; also 
219, 398). 19 
Now it is true that injustice is done only when wrong choice is 
made in distributions of  goods or in other dealings between persons. 
So, when no wrong is done in such dealings, a right answer has been 
found to a practical problem. But that in no way entails that justice 
has anything to do with searching for "the right" distribution, or "the 
right" answer. 
Dworkin's efforts to show that a uniquely correct ("the right") 
answer is normally available in a hard case provide an impressive 
dialectical argument for the contrary and classical view that while 
there are many ways of  going and doing wrong, there are also in 
most situations of  personal and social life a variety of  incompatible 
right options - that we should seek good answers, and eschew bad 
ones, but not dream of best ones. Indeed, Dworkin's account of  the 
relations between "fit" and "soundness" in interpretation helps make 
clear why, in any realistic context, no uniquely correct answer could 
be available in any case where there is identifiable a set of  
two or more options/answers which do not violate any rule binding 
on the judge or other chooser or interpreter. 
19 And justice "is a matter of the right outcome of the political system: the 
right distribution of goods, opportunities and resources" (404), while fairness 
"is a matter of finding political procedures ... that distribute political power 
in the right way" (164; also 404), and procedural due process "is a matter of 
the right procedures ... that promise the right level of accuracy..." (165; also 
405). 
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It is important o note that my denial that uniquely correct, or best, 
answers are available to practical questions has nothing to do with 
scepticism, internal or external. Nor has it anything to do with the 
popular argument which Dworkin, as we have seen, is rightly con- 
cerned to scorn and demolish, viz., that disagreement is endemic. (The 
existence of  disagreement is a mere fact about people, irrelevant o 
the merits of  any practical or other interpretative claim.) As Dworkin 
says, "the wise-sounding judgement that no one interpretation could 
be best must be earned and defended like any other interpretive 
claim" (237-38). 20 Dworkin himself provides the labour and materials 
for such a defence. 
Nor does my denial rest on the observation that none of us has the 
"superhuman" powers of  Dworkin's Hercules. Hercules himself, no 
matter how superhuman, could not justifiably claim unique correct- 
ness for his answer to a hard case (as lawyers in sophisticated legal sys- 
tems use that term). For in such a case, a claim to have found the right 
answer is senseless, in much the same way as it is senseless to claim to 
have identified the English novel which meets the two criteria 
"shortest and most romantic" (or "funniest and best", or "most English 
and most profound"). 21 Two incommensurable criteria of judgment 
are proposed - in Dworkin's theory, "fit" (with past political decisions) 
and '[justifiability" (inherent substantive moral soundness). A hard case 
is hard (not merely novel) when not only is there more than one 
answer which violates no applicable rule, but the answers thus avail- 
able are ranked in different orders along each of  the available criteria 
20 In the context, however, Dworkin seems to treat "no interpretation 
could be best" as equivalent to: no interpretation is worthwhile because 
none can be identified as bad. I endorse the sentence quoted only in its literal 
meaning. 
21 Of course, it is conceivable that a novel might happen to be both the 
most romantic and the funniest. In any realistically rich field, such as the 
English novel, this cannot be expected and the injunction to look for such a 
novel is practically senseless. 
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o f  evaluation: brevity, humour, Englishness, fit (integrity), 22 romance, 
,, " ,, • - . . . .  ,, 23 inherent quahty,  profundity, inherent 3usufiabillty, and so forth. 
In earlier works, Dworkin tried to head of f  the problem of  incom- 
mensurability o f  criteria by proposing a kind o f  lexical ordering: can- 
didates (theories of  law) must fit adequately, and o f  those which satisfy 
this "threshold" criterion, that which ranks highest in soundness i "the 
best" even though it fits less well than (an)other(s). 24This solution was 
empty, for he identified no criteria, however sketchy or "in prin- 
ciple", for specifying when fit is "adequate", i.e., for locating the thres- 
hold o f  fit beyond which the criterion o f  soundness would prevail. 
Presumably, candidates for "the right answer" to the question "When 
22 Cf.: "questions of fit surface again, because an interpretation is pro tanto 
more satisfactory if it shows less damage to integrity than its rival" (246-47). 
Is it not surprising to find "integrity" denoting both the overall virtue of the 
whole interpretative/legal enterprise and one of the "dimensions" of that 
enterprise.~ Dworkin's reply seems to say that because commitment o 
integrity makes no sense without commitment to fairness and justice, every 
legal effort to be fair and just "flows from [an] initial commitment o 
integrity" (263). Non sequitur. 
23 Is it not fishy to find ~ustifiability", an inherently framework concept, 
denoting one of the dimensions or criteria, when the other criterion, "fit", it 
itself inherently evaluative, i.e., justificatory.~ "Best and shortest" is similarly 
dubious, insofar as brevity is commonly accounted a virtue in novels. O f  
course, even when brevity is treated as a mere neutral fact, the quest for the 
best and shortest will still be chimerical in any realistically rich and complex 
field of candidates. 
24 See Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 340-41 (where Dworkin expressly 
envisages the only really interesting and genuine form of hard case or con- 
test between theories or interpretations of the law as a case where the rank 
order in terms of fit of alternatives which all fit "adequately" is different 
from the rank order in terms of soundness), 342, 360, also 122; Ronald Dwor- 
kin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (1984), p. 272. In the third of these pas- 
sages, Dworkin refers also, as if it were equivalent, o the account given in 
'Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases.~' New York L. Rev. 53 
(1978), now A Matter of Principle (1985) at 143; but there the story is that 
political/moral soundness comes into play if, and, it seems, only if, "two 
justifications [scil. theories of law, interpretations, answers] provide 
an equally good fit with the legal materials" (emphasis added). 
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is fit adequate.~" would themselves be ranked in terms both of fit and 
of soundness. An infinite regress, of  the vicious sort which nullify 
purported explanations, was well under way. 
In Law's Empire, Dworkin abandons the simple picture of  a lexical 
ordering between the dimensions of fit and soundness. He stresses that 
within the second dimension "questions of fit surface again, because 
an interpretation is pro tanto more satisfactory if it shows less damage 
to integrity than its rival" (246-47); "even when an interpretation su>- 
vives the threshold requirement, any infelicities of  fit will count 
against it ... in the general balance of political virtues" (256; see also 
257). This is a gain in moral realism. But it strips away the last veil 
hiding the problem of the incommensurability of the criteria 
proposed for identifying a best or uniquely right interpretation, 
theory or answer. We are left with the metaphor: "balance" - as in 
"the general balance of political virtues" embodied in competing 
interpretations. But in the absence of any metric which could com- 
mensurate the  different criteria (the dimensions of fit and 
inherent moral merit), the instruction to "balance" (or, earlier, to 
"weigh") can legitimately mean no more than bear in mind, con- 
scientiously, all the relevant factors, and choose. 
It is a feature of the phenomenology of choice that after one has 
chosen, the factors favouring the chosen alternative will usually seem 
to outweigh or overbalance those favouring the rejected 
ahernative(s).2 s The chosen alternative will seem to have a supremacy, 
a unique rightnessl But the truth is that the choice was not guided by 
"the right answer", but rather established it in the sentiments, the dispo- 
sitions, of the chooser. When the choice is that of  the majority in the 
highest relevant appeal court (a mere brute fact), the unique rightness 
of the answer is established not only for the attitude of those who 
have chosen it, but also for the legal system or community for which 
it has thus been authoritatively chosen and laid down as Or in a rule. 
In the real world, of course, the problem of commensurability is 
much more intense than I have portrayed it; for there is not just one 
2s See Germain Grisez, "Against Consequentialism", Am.J.Jurisp. 23 (1978): 
21-72 at 46-47. 
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dimension of  soundness or substantive political justifiability, but many 
incommensurable dimensions. Their incommensurability is profound- 
ly important for ethics and political, not merely for legal, adjudication. 
It has not been sufficiently noted, in debate on Dworkin's work, how 
thoroughly he shares utilitarianism's deepest and most flawed assump- 
tion: the assumption of  the commensurability of  basic goods and thus 
of the states of affairs which instantiate them. And this assumption is
not marginal to his theory of  law, as his denial of  absolute rights, 26 
though important, can perhaps be said to be marginal; it is of  its 
essence. 
In sum: there are countless ways of  going wrong in a hard case; the 
judgment hat Mrs. McLoughlin and her legal advisers should be 
summarily executed and their property distributed to the defendant 
can head a list of  possible but erroneous judgments which has no end. 
A case is hard, in the sense which interests lawyers, when there is 
more than one right, i.e., not wrong, answer. Dworkin's discussion of  
the two dimensions has made this clearer than ever. 
The objection I have made in this section is not, I think, con- 
fronted in the book. Instead, Dworkin imagines and responds to some 
related objections which are easy to handle because xaggerated and 
ill-focussed. "There can be no best interpretation when more than 
one survives [the] test [of fit]"; therefore Hercules' claim to be 
enforcing the law is fraudulent, or grammatically wrong, or confusing 
(261,262). Dworkin's reply? First, Hercules' claim could be grammati- 
cally wrong only if the semantic sting were truth rather than error. 
That we should accept. Second, Hercules' claim would be fraudulent 
only if he did not share Dworkin's view that the judgments made by 
each judge in a hard case are intended to state what the law is, not 
• merely what it should now become. That, too, we should accept; 
deception is not an issue in jurisprudence. 
26 Taking Rights Seriously, p. 354. On incommensurability, see Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom (1986), ch.13; Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 
112-18 (and see pp. 223-26 on absolute rights); Fundamentals of Ethics, pp, 
86-93; Finnis, Grisez and Boyle, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism 
(1987), pp. 241-54, 267-70, 286-87 (and see pp. 286-87 on moral absolutes). 
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But to the charge that Hercules' claim is confusing, Dworkin 
makes no reply. And the claim /s confusing (and confused), precisely 
because (for the reasons I have been setting out, and not for the bad, 
sceptical, or external reasons which Dworkin envisages as objections), 
in a hard case, in legal systems like ours, there will be no one answer 
which, because uniquely right, should be described as "the law govern- 
ing the case". Moreover (though the descriptive sociology of  all this is 
a secondary issue), Hercules' claim obscures the reality that conscienti- 
ous judges do acknowledge that they are making new law, breaking 
new ground - interstitially, no doubt, and usually by a "development" 
which respects and makes use of existing legal concepts and norma- 
tive resources with an exclusiveness foreign to the legislature's 
ventures in law-making - but for all that, by choice, a new 
commitment, not mere discovery and application. To describe a con- 
scientious judgment in a hard case as legal rather than moral is not 
wrong, for such a judgment will be both constrained and shaped by 
existing law in a way quite unlike any other moral judgment. 27But to 
deny the difference between application and development, easy cases 
and hard cases in the sense I have specified, is indeed misleading. 
Dworkin is right to insist that the answers to easy cases, too, pre- 
suppose conceptions of fairness and justice (354), and in that sense he is 
right to consider easy cases "only special cases of  hard ones" (266). But 
he has no valid argument against he commonsense of lawyers and 
others who think that in some cases there is only one answer which is 
not wrong, while in other (not infrequent) cases there is more than 
one such answer, and reason itself (whether legal or even moral) lacks 
the resources to identify one as best. 
V. 
A primary and perennial source of the need for authority (including 
what Dworkin calls "convention") is the rich variety of  eligible - i.e., 
27 But, unlike Raz and Dworkin, I don't care whether these judgments are 
called judgments of law or not: see Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 290. 
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not wrong - but incompatible answers to issues of  choice 28 in social 
life. 29 I have already observed, in section I above, how Dworkin's 
attention is diverted from the constituent and legislative moments of  
law's "practice". Similarly, it is diverted from the question of  political 
and legal authority's ultimate justification and legitimacy. We come 
upon law half-way through the story; the "most abstract and 
fundamental point of  legal practice is to guide and constrain the 
power o f  government in the following way..." (93). 30 But why 
acknowledge the "power" of  "government" at all? For what 
should a ruler be exercising his power? 
The book does offer a defence of  the legitimacy of  political 
authority. But it is very thirr It consists centrally of  the claim that 
denying political legitimacy (Dworkin's term for what I would call 
justified authority) entails denying, implausibly, the legitimacy of  all 
other associative obligations, i.e., the obligations which arise from 
family, friendship and other fraternal relationships ( ee 207). A prin- 
cipal weakness of  this argument, as developed in the book, is that 
these other fraternal associations are characteristically founded upon 
shared interest in substantive human goods, whereas the political 
community, so far as Dworkin invites us to envisage it, eschews any 
official concern - certainly any imposition of  obligations on the basis 
28 It is hazardous to call such issues "problems", a phrase which seems to 
suggest that the major issues of personal or social choice should be under- 
stood on the analogy of mathematical or technical problems which com- 
monly do have a uniquely correct or best solution; the tendency to see life 
as a series of problems i doing major damage to Western morality and civili- 
zation. 
29 See Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 231-33. Of course, there are other 
primary sources of the need for authority: the transaction costs of negotia- 
tion and deliberation; selfishness, malice, etc. 
3o Sometimes Dworkin speaks as if"iflaw exists it provides a justification for 
the use of collective power against individual citizens or groups" (109, 
emphasis added) and says that "the ultimate point of law is to license andjusti- 
.~ state coercion..." (127, emphasis added). But the initial statement (at 93) is 
truer to his account, which is of law as a constraint upon the exercise of 
authority. 
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of such concern - fo r  substantive human goods such as health, 
knowledge, beauty, the transmission of  human life and culture, and so 
forth. In this respect, the book, while it differs from Dworkin's earlier 
books by abstaining from explicitly (but cf. 274) describing itself as 
"liberal", retains the salient characteristic of  Dworkinian liberalism: it 
portrays justified politics, and thus law, as neutral about what is truly 
worthwhile and what worthless in human life. 31 It lacks any 
articulated concept of  the common good, an ensemble of  conditions 
which favour the human flourishing (including rights) of  all members 
of  the community, and which ought to be promoted as well as 
respected by those in authority, and for the sake of  which others 
acknowledge that authority. 
The other principal weakness in Dworkin's account of  legitimacy 
or authority is that his discussion of  the problem of  securing any 
desirable degree of co-ordination of human action in community is 
buried in his polemic against "conventionalism" (see 144-50). Now I 
have no brief for (or against) conventionalism, an imaginary 
doctrine 32 which Dworkin envisages as the substantive political/juris- 
prudential counterpart (432) to the semantic theory he calls 
"positivism".33 I will, however, observe in passing that his critique of  
31 The unwillingness to speak of goods or harms is remarkably far-reaching. 
Thus, in the discussion of negligence, where we would expect a reference to 
harms we find only a reference to rights: see 293; cf. 307, 309, where, at last, 
the categories "fundamental interests" and "damage - e.g. threats to life" are 
acknowledged. 
32 Conventionalism, though imaginary, is presented in loaded terms: see 95, 
135. 
33 Dworkin admits that perhaps no one has ever subscribed to conven- 
tionalism precisely as he describes it (94). But I doubt whether anyone 
significant subscribes to anything even resembling Dworkin's conventional- 
ism, the key tenet of which is that "the past yields no rights tenable in court, 
except as these are made uncontroversial by what everyone knows and 
expects" (118). To claim that "if convention issilent there is no law" (118) is 
a far cry from asserting that the past has no justificatory "power over the 
present" of a kind highly relevant o the judge's proper exercise of his 
judicial power and in that sense "tenable in court" - an assertion few indeed 
have made, even those who have unwisely spoken of judicial 
"discretion" when the law runs out. 
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conventionalism (147-50) is very weak. For he simply enrolls "prag- 
matism" to make the response, and purports to endorse a pragmatist 
claim that pragmatism is more "efficient" at coordinating citizens' 
actions because "it is so much more adaptive" (149). He himself 
will rightly later argue, in effect, that pragmatism is unwarranted in 
taking efficiency as the criterion or model o f  political justification. 
But my present point is simply this: Dworkin's theory o f  law, and 
o f  law's authority or legitimacy, is weakened by his failure frankly to 
acknowledge the case, not merely for making "past politics decisive o f  
present rights" in accordance with an ideal and virtue o f  "integrity", 
but for creating and applying rules whose legal and moral authority is 
directly and simply ascribed to their source, authoritative nactment or 
judicial adoption or some other form of  "convention". 34 In attending 
to the fact o f  consensus - so fundamental to the existence and 
worth 35 o f  legal systems, and o f  a community's judiciary - Dworkin 
34 Dworkin's text leaves me in doubt about whether he takes the conven- 
tions with which "conventionalism" is concerned to be quasi-constitutional 
conventions defining broad institutions such as legislation, Congress, 
precedent, etc., or whether he takes them to include also particular institu- 
tions and rules established under those constitutional conventions. Much in 
the text suggests the former, but other passages are consistent with thelatter, 
and at least one seems to require it: "Suppose there is a convention in some 
legal community that judges must give both sides an equal opportunity to 
state their case" (123). 
3s Many will think that Dworkin's emphasis on consistency with the past 
(passim), and on demanding that a principle given effect to in one part of law 
should "flow throughout he scheme" of the law (436), should have been 
balanced by a clear recognition (clearer and earlier than 401) of the worth of 
having clear rules (and loyal adherence to them) for securing that litigants 
are treated uniformly at a given time, and so do not suffer more than is 
inevitable from the excruciating sense that if their case had been tried on 
the same day by the judge next door it would probably have been deter- 
mined differently (e.g. because each judge is attempting the impossible 
and all-too creative interpretative task envisaged for him by  Dworkin, 
instead of applying the rules). Is it symptomatic that the book contains 
some big mistakes in reporting precedents to which it refers, (notably 
(2) Attorney-General v.Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] Q.B. 752; and (185) Roe 
v. Wade 410 U.S. 113); and some implausibly dismissive opinions about 
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tries to make us choose between basing that consensus on convention 
- which means treating legal propositions as true 'just because very- 
one  else accepts them" (136) - or on "consensus of  independent con- 
viction", "the way we all accept hat it is wrong to torture babies or 
to convict people we know are innocent" (136). This disjunction 
between convention and consensus of  conviction, so defined, is 
entirely inadequate to explain and justify legal authority, institu- 
tions and obligation. We should refuse to make this choice. But if we 
were forced to choose, a sound natural aw theory would have no 
hesitation in tracing the legal and thus the moral authority of  most of  
the law's rules and institutions (the establishment, though not the 
content, of which is urgently required for the sake of  fairness and the 
other components of  the common good) not to consensus of 
independent conviction but to convention. 36
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the integrity (as distinct from the justifiability in principle) of certain rules, 
such as the one giving immunity in tort to barristers in court (cf. 220, 401), 
or forbidding the importation of slaves only after a 20-year un-off period 
(184)? The horizon is ordinarily not the best focus for the judicial gaze. 
36 See Natural Law and Natural Rights, 281-90; 'The Authority of Law in the 
Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory', Notre Dame Journal of Law, 
Ethics and Public Policy 1 (1984) 115-37. 
